Appendix D: Historical Movement Rates
This appendix collects march rate data from across three thousand years of military history. It exists because I got tired of hunting through a dozen books every time I needed to convert real-world movement into game movement points. If you are designing a wargame at any scale from ancient to modern, this table and the commentary around it should save you time.
The numbers come from primary sources, military field manuals, and the work of historians who cared enough to do the math. Where figures conflict between sources, I have noted the range. Where a number is an estimate or reconstruction rather than a recorded measurement, I have said so.
The Central Fact
Infantry march rates held steady from antiquity to 1945. A Roman legionary and a World War II rifleman moved at the same speed on foot: fifteen to twenty miles per day on roads under favorable conditions. The Macedonian army’s average rate for the full force was about fifteen miles per day. Two thousand years later, German infantry divisions in Russia marched at twelve to eighteen.
The human body set the speed limit for three millennia. Everything else shifted around it. Cavalry opened the first speed gap. Railroads rewired logistics. Mechanization split land forces into foot-speed units and engine-speed units, and that split drives the design of every World War II operational game you will build.
March Rates by Era
Ancient Armies
Alexander’s Macedonian Army (from Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army, 1978)
Engels compiled the most rigorous data set available for any ancient army. His Table 7 records march rates derived from cross-referencing Arrian, Curtius, and Diodorus against measured distances on the actual terrain.
| Route | Rate (mi/day) | Force Composition |
|---|---|---|
| Therma to Sestos | 16.2 | Whole army |
| Sardis to Ephesus | 15.0 | Whole army |
| Gaza to Pelusium (Sinai crossing) | 19.5 | Whole army |
| Babylon to Susa | 12.3 | Whole army |
| Paraetonium to Ammon Oracle | 22.5 | Small, light force |
| Ecbatana to Rhagae | 22.0 | Cavalry, mounted scouts, part of phalanx |
| Rhagae to Caspian Gates | 34.0 | Same mounted/light force |
| Pursuit in Assyria | ~46.0 | Cavalry only |
| Sogdiana (Alexandria Eschate to Maracanda) | 43-57.5 | Half the Companions, archers, lightest phalanx |
| Mallians’ Territory | ~30.6 | Bodyguard, archers, Agrianians, mounted archers, half cavalry |
| Oreitans to Pura (Gedrosian Desert) | 10.5-13.0 | Whole army minus fleet and Craterus |
The full Macedonian army, one of the best-organized forces in ancient history, averaged about fifteen miles per day over sustained marches. Its maximum recorded rate for the entire force was 19.5 miles per day, achieved crossing the Sinai where the fleet handled supply. Small mounted forces reached thirty to fifty miles per day, but those were cavalry and light infantry operating without baggage.
Engels highlights something designers at all scales should internalize: large armies move slower than small ones. Column length creates compounding delays. An army of 65,000 personnel marching ten abreast with 6,000 cavalry five abreast forms a column over sixteen miles long. When the front of the column reaches camp, the rear is still five hours of marching behind. Halts ripple backward through the column, and restarting movement takes time proportional to column length. A one-minute delay at an obstacle costs the rear of the column far more than a minute.
Roman Legions (from Vegetius, De Re Militari; Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War, 1999)
| March Type | Rate (mi/day) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Standard march (iter justum) | ~14 | 15 Roman miles; includes building a fortified camp each night |
| Full march (iter magnum) | ~18 | 20 Roman miles |
| Forced march (iter celerissimum) | 22+ | 24+ Roman miles; unsustainable beyond a few days |
Caesar’s legions in Gaul covered fifteen to twenty miles per day while constructing a fortified camp each evening. Caesar traveling light with a cavalry escort and relay horses could cover eighty to a hundred miles in a day, but that is courier speed, not army speed.
Mongol Cavalry (from May, The Mongol Art of War, 2007)
| Movement Type | Rate (mi/day) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Normal advance | 30-40 | Each warrior maintained 3-5 remounts |
| Forced march / raid | 60-80 | Documented during Subotai’s campaigns |
| Strategic sprint | ~60 | 1241 invasion of Hungary: ~180 miles in 3 days through Carpathian passes, in winter |
No pre-mechanized force moved faster. The Mongols achieved these rates because their warriors rode, kept three to five spare horses each, and carried almost no baggage. They ate from their herds and from the land. No other military system combined universal horsemanship with such minimal logistics.
Early Modern: The Thirty Years’ War through Marlborough
Van Creveld (Supplying War, 1977) documents the growth of European armies and the logistics that constrained their movement from the sixteenth through early eighteenth centuries.
By the late seventeenth century, armies had grown so large that moving them became a logistics problem before it was a tactical one. Maurice of Nassau’s 1602 campaign in Brabant required 3,000 wagons for 24,000 men, one wagon for every eight soldiers. A typical army of 30,000 trailed a crowd of women, children, servants, and sutlers equal to fifty to one hundred and fifty percent of its combat strength. All of it moved at ox-cart speed.
| Force | Rate (mi/day) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Spanish Army of Flanders, march to Netherlands, 1567 | 10-12 | Along the “Spanish Road” through Alps and Rhineland |
| Gustavus Adolphus, campaign marches 1630-32 | 8-12 | Limited by siege operations and supply from magazines |
| Marlborough’s march to the Danube, 1704 | 10-12 | 250 miles in ~25 marching days, one of the great operational marches of the era |
| Typical Thirty Years’ War army | 5-10 | Burdened by enormous baggage trains and camp followers |
Louvois standardized the magazine system for Louis XIV’s armies after 1660, tethering armies to fixed depots by road. March planning worked backward from supply availability. Armies moved from magazine to magazine. The practical operating radius was five days’ march, about seventy-five miles, from the nearest depot. Campaigns in this period looked like elaborate chess games between fortified supply points because they were.
Eighteenth Century
Frederick the Great’s Prussians (from Duffy, The Army of Frederick the Great, 1974; The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 1987)
| Movement Type | Rate (mi/day) |
|---|---|
| Standard march | 12-15 |
| Forced march | up to 20 |
Frederick’s campaigns were fought in compact theaters (Silesia, Saxony, Bohemia) where strategic speed mattered less than battlefield maneuver. His army’s march rates were typical for the period. Duffy describes the eighteenth-century soldier’s daily routine as dominated by the march itself: armies rose before dawn, were on the road by four or five in the morning, and halted by early afternoon after covering twelve to fifteen miles. The rest of the day went to foraging, camp construction, and the administrative overhead of keeping tens of thousands of men fed.
The supply system, not the soldier’s legs, set the speed limit. The magazine-based logistics that Van Creveld documents forced eighteenth-century generals to plan campaigns around depots rather than objectives. Frederick’s advantage was that he operated in small theaters where he could fight decisive battles within supply range of his magazines.
Napoleonic Era
Marching Cadences by Nation (from Nafziger, Imperial Bayonets, 1996)
Nafziger compiled marching cadences from the drill regulations of every major Napoleonic army. These prescribed speeds for different march types show how fast individual soldiers moved on the ground.
| Nation | Pace Type | Paces/min | Feet/min |
|---|---|---|---|
| Austrian | Ordinairschritt (ordinary) | 90-95 | 188-198 |
| Austrian | Geschwindschritt (quick) | 105 | 219 |
| Austrian | Doublirschritt (double) | 120 | 250 |
| French | Pas ordinaire | 76 | 165 |
| French | Pas de route (route march) | 85-90 | 184-195 |
| French | Pas accéléré | 100 | 217 |
| French | Pas de charge | 120 | 260 |
| Prussian | Ordinaire Schritt | 75 | 156 |
| Prussian | Geschwindschritt | 108 | 225 |
| British | Ordinary pace | 75 | 188 |
| British | Quick pace | 108 | 270 |
| Russian | Tchyi szag (slow) | 60-70 | 150-175 |
| Russian | Skoryi szag (quick) | 100-110 | 250-275 |
At route march speed, most armies covered about 180 to 200 feet per minute, or roughly two miles per hour. In theory, a seven-hour march day produces fourteen miles. In practice, column friction, rest halts, bottlenecks at bridges and defiles, and the time needed to deploy from march column into camp eat heavily into that number. The gap between individual marching speed and army movement rate is where most game designers go wrong.
Column Length and Its Effects (from Nafziger and Engels)
Nafziger recorded the frontage of a single battalion in line for each major army. These numbers determine column length on the march and how long it takes an army to clear a road.
| Nation | Year | Battalion Length in Line (ft) |
|---|---|---|
| Austrian | 1807 | 684-762 |
| British | 1792 | 640 |
| French | 1791 | 560 |
| French | 1808 | 480 |
| Prussian | 1792 | 360 |
| Prussian | 1808 | 344 |
| Russian | 1802 | 368 |
A French corps of 20,000 men marching in column of route on a single road could stretch ten to fifteen miles from head to tail. When the vanguard reaches the day’s destination, the rear guard is still hours away. Engels identified the same problem for Alexander’s army, and it imposes the same speed ceiling: about fifteen miles per day for a full army on a single road. Napoleon’s system of corps marching on separate roads within mutual supporting distance was his answer to the column-length problem.
Napoleon’s Grande Armee (from Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 1966; Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions and War, 1979)
| Movement Type | Rate (mi/day) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Sustained corps march | 15 | Standard operational tempo |
| Forced march | 20-25 | Sustainable for several consecutive days |
| Extreme forced march | 30+ | Davout’s III Corps before Austerlitz: ~70 miles in 46 hours |
| Cavalry, strategic | 25-30 | Sustained; up to 50 in pursuit |
| Artillery train | 10-12 | The slowest element and the pacing factor |
Dupuy’s campaign advance rate data, measured as the average daily advance across the full campaign including combat and rest days, shows how much friction eats into raw march speed:
| Campaign | Distance (km) | Days | Advance Rate (km/day) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Marengo, 1800 | 350 | 31 | 11 |
| Ulm, 1805 | 475 | 22 | 22 |
| Jena, 1806 | 140 | 6 | 23 |
| Friedland, 1807 | 210 | 9 | 23 |
| Aspern-Wagram, 1809 | 405 | 30 | 14 |
| Russia, 1812 | 680 | 57 | 12 |
| Lutzen-Bautzen, 1813 | 300 | 20 | 15 |
An army that marches fifteen miles per day advances at a campaign rate closer to eight to fourteen miles per day once you account for rest days, combat, supply halts, and the friction of moving tens of thousands of men across real terrain. Your game’s movement allowances should produce results closer to the campaign column than the march column.
Van Creveld (Supplying War, 1977) established that the practical radius of supply from a fixed magazine for pre-railroad armies was about seventy-five to a hundred miles, five to seven days of march. Beyond that distance, an army had to either live off the land or establish a new depot. Napoleon’s system of foraging from the countryside allowed faster movement in fertile, densely populated regions. In Spain and Russia, where the countryside was sparse, march rates dropped to eight to twelve miles per day because of foraging requirements.
American Civil War
| Force Type | Rate (mi/day) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Standard infantry | 10-15 | On roads, good conditions |
| Forced march infantry | 20-25 | Unsustainable beyond 2-3 days without heavy straggling |
| Cavalry, mounted | 25-35 | Stuart’s ride around McClellan: ~25/day average |
| Supply wagons, good roads | 10-15 | |
| Supply wagons, bad roads or mud | 5-8 |
Stonewall Jackson’s Valley Campaign, May-June 1862: Jackson’s infantry covered roughly 650 miles in 48 days, averaging about 13.5 miles per day including rest days. Peak single-day marches reached 35 to 40 miles during the campaign. Before the Seven Days Battles, his corps marched about 100 miles in five days (from Tanner, Stonewall in the Valley, 1996).
Sherman’s March to the Sea, November-December 1864: Atlanta to Savannah, roughly 285 miles in about 35 marching days, averaging eight to ten miles per day. The army moved on a front 25 to 60 miles wide, foraging extensively, which limited daily distance.
Franco-Prussian War, 1870-71
The Franco-Prussian War marks the transition from foot-mobile to rail-mobile warfare. Howard (The Franco-Prussian War, 1961) documents both sides.
Railroad vs. marching: In 1859, rail moved armies into position within a fortnight that would have required sixty days to march. A four-to-one speed advantage. By 1870, Moltke built his entire war plan around railroad concentration. German forces dispersed over a hundred miles between Karlsruhe and Coblenz converged by rail faster than the French could mobilize.
On foot, the numbers were familiar. German corps on the march covered about fifteen miles in eight hours, roughly 1.9 miles per hour. The advance from Sedan to Paris, about 150 miles, took roughly thirteen days: eleven to twelve miles per day. Cavalry patrols ranged up to forty-five miles ahead of the infantry.
The supply failures are worth studying if you design in this period. The French Intendance had six thousand rations for more than forty thousand men at Froeschwiller. Troops went four days without an adequate meal. The Army of Chalons detoured eighteen miles off its line of march just to reach a railway for resupply. Even the Germans, with their superior organization, were saved from starvation only by capturing French stocks.
World War I
| Movement Type | Rate (mi/day) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Approach march, on road | 15-20 | Same as Napoleonic rates |
| Tactical advance under fire | 1-5 | The core WWI problem |
| Defender movement by rail | 50-100+ | The reason breakthroughs failed |
Kluck’s First Army, August 1914 (from Tuchman, The Guns of August): 150 miles in 11 days, approximately 13.6 miles per day on average. On the outer rim of the Schlieffen wheel, forced marches reached 25 to 28 miles per day. Troops marched for sixteen consecutive days without rest before the Battle of the Marne. By early September they were physically spent.
Hausen’s Third Army (Saxon): averaged 14.3 miles per day, described as the least demanded of the German armies.
The Spring Offensives, 1918: Ludendorff’s Michael offensive advanced about 40 miles in 16 days, roughly 2.5 miles per day. This was the practical limit of foot-mobile logistics in the face of organized defense.
The Western Front locked up for four years because of a speed asymmetry. Attackers moved at foot speed, five to ten miles per day through broken ground. Defenders moved at rail speed, fifty to a hundred miles per day, and sealed breaches faster than attackers could exploit them. Mechanization broke the stalemate by giving the attacker speed that matched the defender’s rail advantage.
Railroad mobilization data from Tuchman: one German army corps required 6,010 railway cars grouped in 140 trains, plus an equal number for supplies. Moltke scheduled 11,000 trains, each crossing specified tracks at ten-minute intervals. The Schlieffen Plan was a railroad timetable dressed in field gray.
World War II
| Movement Type | Rate (mi/day) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Infantry on roads | 15-20 | Unchanged since antiquity |
| Infantry, cross-country | 10-15 | |
| Armor on roads, low resistance | 30-50 | |
| Armor, against organized defense | 5-15 | |
| Combat advance, light resistance | 12-15 | FM 101-10 planning factor |
| Combat advance, heavy resistance | 3-6 | FM 101-10 planning factor |
| Motorized infantry, road movement | 100-150 | Non-combat administrative movement |
| Armored units, road movement | 100-150 | Non-combat administrative movement |
| Armored units, cross-country | 50-75 | Non-combat administrative movement |
| Supply convoy by truck | 150-200 |
Blitzkrieg advance rates:
- France 1940: Guderian’s XIX Panzer Corps, Sedan to the Channel, roughly 150 miles in six days. About 25 miles per day.
- Barbarossa 1941: Army Group Center covered roughly 600 miles (Brest-Litovsk to Smolensk) in four weeks, about 21 miles per day. Peak daily advances of 40-50 miles for armored spearheads. By autumn, rates dropped to 5-10 miles per day as logistics broke down.
- Patton’s Third Army, August 1944: roughly 600 miles across France in four weeks, about 21 miles per day average, with peak advances of 50 miles per day.
Dupuy’s campaign advance rates for WWII:
| Campaign | Distance (km) | Days | Advance Rate (km/day) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Flanders, 1940 | 368 | 12 | 31 |
| Barbarossa, 1941 | 700 | 24 | 29 |
| Malaya, 1941-42 | 515 | 28 | 18 |
| Caucasus, 1942 | 775 | 34 | 23 |
| Normandy Breakout, 1944 | 880 | 32 | 28 |
| Manchuria, 1945 | 300 | 6 | 50 |
| Sinai, 1967 | 220 | 4 | 55 |
German infantry in Russia fell behind the panzers at every stage, opening the gaps between armored spearheads and following foot-mobile divisions that defined Barbarossa. If you design a World War II game at operational scale or above, your movement system must produce this gap. Infantry and armor moving at the same rate is not World War II.
The Mobility Problem: German Forces in Normandy, 1944 (from Zetterling, Normandy 1944, 2000)
Zetterling’s study of German forces in Normandy demolishes the assumption that mechanized armies move at mechanized speed. Many divisions in the west lacked enough trucks, spare parts, and fuel to move at anything close to their theoretical road speed.
Several panzer divisions committed to Normandy were rebuilding after sustained combat on the Eastern Front. Replacements needed training. Key specialists were missing. When headquarters issued movement orders, units could not execute them because they lacked the vehicles. The slow German response to the invasion owed as much to physical inability to move as to confused command or Allied air interdiction.
Allied air power’s effect on movement has been overstated. Zetterling found that direct casualties and equipment losses from air attack were limited. The more significant effects were on decision-making, morale, and the delays from forcing road movement into nighttime hours. The single most effective Allied air contribution was the strategic bombing of the French rail network, which mattered because so many German units depended on rail for long-distance movement.
For the designer, this means vehicle shortages, fuel constraints, and rail interdiction can matter as much as enemy opposition in determining actual movement rates. A panzer division at 60% vehicle strength does not move at panzer speed. Your movement system should degrade with logistics, not just with enemy contact.
Terrain Effects on Movement
Dupuy’s Quantified Judgment Model (Numbers, Predictions and War, 1979) provides terrain mobility multipliers derived from operational research across dozens of twentieth-century battles. The baseline is rolling, bare terrain, set at 1.0.
| Terrain Type | Mobility Multiplier |
|---|---|
| Flat, bare, hard ground | 1.05 |
| Flat, mixed vegetation | 0.90 |
| Rolling, bare (baseline) | 1.00 |
| Rolling, mixed | 0.80 |
| Rolling, heavily wooded | 0.60 |
| Flat desert | 0.95 |
| Rolling dunes | 0.30 |
| Rugged, bare | 0.60 |
| Rugged, mixed | 0.50 |
| Rugged, heavily wooded | 0.40 |
| Swamp, jungled | 0.30 |
| Swamp, mixed/open | 0.40 |
| Urban | 0.70 |
You can translate these into hex-based movement costs by inverting them. If clear terrain costs one movement point per hex, rugged-wooded terrain should cost about 2.5 (the inverse of 0.40). Rolling-mixed costs about 1.25. Flat desert costs about the same as clear terrain, which catches some designers off guard. Desert ground is firm and open. The hard part of desert warfare is supply, not the surface you are driving across.
Weather multipliers from the same source:
| Condition | Mobility Effect |
|---|---|
| Dry, temperate (baseline) | 1.00 |
| Dry, extreme heat | 0.90 |
| Dry, extreme cold | 0.90 |
| Light rain/snow, temperate | 0.80 |
| Light rain/snow, cold | 0.80 |
| Heavy rain/snow, temperate | 0.60 |
| Heavy rain/snow, extreme heat | 0.50 |
| Heavy rain/snow, extreme cold | 0.50 |
Heavy rain cuts mobility close to half. Mud season on the Eastern Front, monsoon in Burma, rasputitsa in Russia: these conditions stalled offensives that had plenty of men and ammunition. If your game covers a period with weather variation, your weather rules need teeth.
Supply Constraints on Movement
An army’s theoretical march rate and its actual sustained advance differ, and supply accounts for most of the gap.
Early modern armies (from Van Creveld):
- By the early seventeenth century, a typical army of 30,000 had one wagon for every eight to fifteen men, each drawn by two to four horses. Maurice of Nassau’s 1602 campaign: 3,000 wagons for 24,000 men.
- The camp-following population (women, children, servants, sutlers) ranged from 50% to 150% of the fighting strength. All of it marched with the army and consumed supplies.
- Soldiers purchased food from their pay at organized markets in garrison. On campaign, the system collapsed into plunder unless magazines were established along the route.
- The magazine system, formalized under Louvois in the 1660s, solved the plunder problem but imposed rigid geographic constraints. Armies could not outrun their depots.
Pre-railroad armies, ancient through Napoleonic (from Engels and Van Creveld):
- A pack animal carrying 250 pounds of supplies consumes about 20 pounds of its own cargo per day in fodder and grain. After roughly twelve days, it has eaten everything it was carrying.
- Practical supply radius from a fixed depot: 75-100 miles (5-7 days of march).
- Alexander’s army consumed roughly 195,000 pounds of grain per day for personnel alone, plus 61,000 pounds for cavalry horses, plus feed for baggage animals. In desert conditions requiring carried water, the total daily requirement exceeded 1,260,000 pounds.
- The army could carry at most a two-and-a-half-day supply of provisions in waterless desert.
Napoleonic era:
- Van Creveld’s central finding: a four-horse wagon carried about 1,400 pounds but consumed its own payload in fodder within about five days of travel. The supply system was self-consuming.
- Napoleon’s army on the march to Moscow, 1812: 550 miles in about 80 days, an advance rate of under seven miles per day for an army that could march fifteen.
World War II (from Dupuy):
- A WWII-era division required roughly 181 tons of supply per day: 84 tons of ammunition, 47 tons of fuel, 25 tons of food, 15 tons of fodder, 10 tons of equipment.
- A WWI-era division required roughly 117.5 tons per day.
- At the Anzio beachhead, combat effectiveness degraded measurably when supply delivery dropped below 65% of requirements.
Your movement rates should reflect what supply allows. An armored division on paper can cover 100 miles per day on roads. In practice, fuel limits it to 30-50 miles per day in an advance, and far less if the logistics chain stretches. Movement allowances measure how far a unit can advance and still fight when it arrives.
Comparative Summary
| Era / Force Type | Sustained March (mi/day) | Forced March (mi/day) | Limiting Factor |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alexander’s full army | 15-16 | 19.5 | Water, forage, column length |
| Alexander’s light/mounted forces | 22-34 | 43-57 | Remount availability |
| Roman legion | 14-18 | 22+ | Camp construction time |
| Mongol cavalry | 30-40 | 60-80 | Remount availability |
| Crusader armies | 8-12 | 15 | Heat, water, combat |
| Thirty Years’ War armies | 5-10 | 12-15 | Baggage trains, camp followers |
| Marlborough’s army, 1704 | 10-12 | 15 | Magazine-based supply |
| Frederick’s Prussians | 12-15 | 20 | Supply magazine range |
| Napoleon’s infantry | 15 | 25-30 | Food, shoes, straggling |
| Napoleon’s cavalry | 25-30 | 50 | Forage for horses |
| Civil War infantry | 10-15 | 20-25 | Roads, weather, straggling |
| Civil War cavalry | 25-35 | 40+ | Forage |
| Franco-Prussian infantry | 12-15 | 18-20 | Rail-based supply |
| WWI infantry | 15-20 | 25 | Rail-mobile reserves negate gains |
| WWII infantry | 15-20 | 25 | Unchanged since Alexander |
| WWII armor, road | 30-50 | 100+ | Fuel supply |
| WWII armor, combat advance | 5-15 | 25-40 | Opposition + fuel |
| Post-1945 mechanized | 25-55 | 100+ | Fuel, air interdiction |
Using This Data in Design
These numbers are where you start. Translating historical march rates into movement points requires you to account for hex scale, turn length, and the abstraction level your movement points represent.
A simple method: divide the daily march rate by your hex scale to get a base movement allowance. If your operational game uses 10-mile hexes and weekly turns, and a Civil War infantry division marches about 12 miles per day with one rest day in seven, that division covers roughly 72 miles per week, or 7 hexes. Round to 6 or 8 depending on how much command friction and supply delay you want baked into the movement allowance versus handled by other mechanics.
Then apply terrain multipliers. Dupuy’s table gives you the ratios. If clear terrain costs 1 movement point, woods should cost more, roads should cost less, mountains should cost the most. The specific costs will depend on how your combat and supply systems interact with positioning. Playtest and adjust. You can check your results against the historical data. If your mechanics produce movement that matches the tables above, you are in the right range.
Keep march rates and combat advance rates separate. A unit moving through empty territory advances at march rate. A unit advancing against resistance moves at combat advance rate, which Dupuy’s campaign data shows rarely exceeds fifteen to twenty-five kilometers per day even in successful offensives. Your movement system should allow high movement in open territory and produce slower net advances in contested areas through zones of control, enemy reaction, and combat results. Reduce the movement allowance to reflect supply and terrain. Let the enemy reduce the advance rate.
Sources
- Chandler, David. The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York: Macmillan, 1966.
- Duffy, Christopher. The Army of Frederick the Great. Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1974.
- Duffy, Christopher. The Military Experience in the Age of Reason. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987.
- Dupuy, Trevor N. Numbers, Predictions and War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Battles. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1979.
- Engels, Donald W. Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
- Howard, Michael. The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871. London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1961.
- May, Timothy. The Mongol Art of War. Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2007.
- Nafziger, George F. Imperial Bayonets: Tactics of the Napoleonic Battery, Battalion and Brigade as Found in Contemporary Regulations. Novato: Presidio Press, 1996.
- Roth, Jonathan. The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (264 B.C. - A.D. 235). Leiden: Brill, 1999.
- Tanner, Robert G. Stonewall in the Valley: Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley Campaign, Spring 1862. Rev. ed. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 1996.
- Tuchman, Barbara W. The Guns of August. New York: Macmillan, 1962.
- U.S. Army. FM 101-10, Staff Officers’ Field Manual: Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data. Washington: Department of the Army, 1959.
- Van Creveld, Martin. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- Vegetius. De Re Militari. c. 390 AD.
- Zetterling, Niklas. Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness. Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz, 2000.